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Abstract 
Over the past few decades, falling voter turnout rates have induced governments to adopt 
compulsory voting laws, in order to mitigate issues such as the socioeconomic voter gap and 
to bring a broader spectrum of voters into the fold. This paper presents evidence that the 
introduction of mandatory voting laws increases voter turnout rates by 13 points within a 
particular country through an entity- and time-fixed effect panel model. Moreover, it 
includes a discussion of the implications of adopting mandatory voting policies within the 
United States, finding that compelling citizens to vote would have increased participation 
rates to over 90 percent in the past four presidential elections.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Other countries have mandatory voting. It would be transformative if  
everybody voted – that would counteract money more than anything. 
U.S. President Barack Obama (via WhiteHouse.gov) 
 
Though the United States is considered one of the world’s oldest democracies, it has one of 
the lowest voting levels of all democracies (Franklin 2004).1 In the United States, voter 
turnout—the percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in an election—has declined 
substantially for presidential elections from 96 percent in 1964 to 67 percent in 2012 (see 
Figure 1). This phenomenon is equally true in other democracies, with some turnout rates 
lower than 60 percent. In a speech on March 2015 in Cleveland, Ohio, President Barack 
Obama endorsed mandatory voting in the United States.2 President Obama suggested that 
                                                 
1 Switzerland, which vies for the title of the “world’s oldest democracy,” has turnout rates that are even lower 
than that of the United States. 
2 Throughout this paper, I will use the terms “compulsory voting” and “mandatory voting” interchangeably. 
Both terms refer to a citizen’s obligation to register and attend a polling booth instead of an obligation to 
actually vote. Even under mandatory voting laws, citizens are free to cast blank or invalid ballots. 
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mandatory voting would transform the current political landscape by bringing voices of the 
young, the poor, immigrants, and minorities into the fold (Somin 2015). 
Figure 1 Voter turnout for American presidential elections, 1964 – 20123 
 
 According to the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA), at least 35 countries adopted some form of mandatory voting procedure between 
1945 and 2015. These countries include nine members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation (OECD) and two-thirds of Latin American nations. More than half of them use 
various enforcement mechanisms to ensure there is a legal punishment behind the law, while 
the rest merely rely on the “moral force of the law” (Galston 2011). Australia, which has a 
comparable government structure and level of democracy to the United States, adopted 
mandatory voting in 1924 when their voter turnout was lower than 60 percent in 1922. After 
voting became mandatory with small sanctions imposed on nonvoters, voter participation in 
                                                 
3 (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015a). 
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Australia surged from 59 percent to 91 percent in the election of 1925 and has remained 
consistently high over the years (Orszag 2012, Australian Electoral Commission 2014, 
International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015a). 
Australia illustrates how much compulsory voting can increase political participation 
within a particular polity. Proponents of mandatory voting argue that, by making voting 
compulsory, voter turnout rates increase and a democracy such as Australia can ideally 
operate better by reflecting the true perspectives and concerns of whole population. Hill 
(2006) argues that compulsory voting can additionally lessen the corrupt influence of 
campaign finances and break the cycle of alienation and exclusion within American politics, 
preserving democratic values of popular sovereignty, political equality, representativeness, 
and minimization of elite power. Opponents of compulsory voting question its ability to 
increase voter turnout. Somin (2012) argues that while Australia may present an ideal 
alternative to current political apathy in the United States, other countries with compulsory 
voting legislation compulsory voting legislation, such as Argentina, Lebanon, Egypt, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, are hardly good examples of well-functioning 
democracies. For instance, despite compulsory voting laws, Lebanon and Egypt have had 
turnout as low as 30 percent and 23 percent, respectively. Switzerland, which is one of the 
few democracies with an even lower turnout than the United States, is “widely considered 
one of the best-governed nations in the world,” suggesting that mandatory voting does not 
necessarily promulgate democratic legitimacy (Somin 2012). 
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the impact on mandatory voting policies on 
voter turnout within a particular country and to assess the particular case of compulsory 
voting in the United States. This thesis has two distinctive parts: one qualitative and one 
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quantitative. In the qualitative part, I utilize country case studies to analyze how voter 
turnout can change when switching between voluntary and compulsory voting systems. In 
the quantitative part, I use both a pooled cross-sectional time-series regression model and an 
entity- and time-fixed effect panel regression model to understand the impact of compulsory 
voting laws on voter turnout, controlling for various political and socioeconomic factors.  
My evidence contributes to the debate in the following ways: first, I look at a wider 
selection of countries over a longer time-period than other studies, and second, I utilize a 
panel regression model to remove omitted variable bias found within countries and overtime 
that other cross-sectional studies fail to capture. I supplement this analysis with a section on 
the adoption of compulsory voting policies in the United States. By applying my model to 
the United States, I predict what voter turnout would have been if voting in America was 
mandatory for the past few presidential elections. 
This thesis proceeds as follows: first, I present background information as to why 
this debate has arisen and, in the process, elaborate on the problem of low voter turnout in 
present-day democracies. Next, I present a literature review of the various empirical methods 
economists and political theorists have used to analyze the impact that compulsory voting 
policies have on voter turnout. Then, I dive into a qualitative assessment of mandatory 
voting within particular country case studies.  I proceed with a quantitative section, where I 
include an empirical specification and discuss the explanations, conclusions, and limitations 
of my results. I end with an analysis of compulsory voting in the United States, focusing on 
critical barriers to its adoption.  
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Chapter 2 
Background 
American voter turnout presents an interesting paradox: Americans seem to be more politically  
aware and involved than citizens in any other democracy, yet the levels of voter turnout in the  
United States are consistently far below the average. 
G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (via American Political Science Review) 
 
2.1 Is Low Voter Turnout a Problem? 
 
Prior to discussing the implications of compulsory voting legislation on turnout, it is 
important to understand a brief background behind voter turnout. This section aims to 
answer the following questions: What has been the general trend of voter turnout? If turnout 
is low, does it present a problem?  
It is a well-documented phenomenon that among established democracies, voter 
turnout has been declining. Figure 2 shows that the turnout in the presidential elections of 
20 democratic countries, measured as a ratio of actual voters to registered voters, has 
declined since World War II. The Y-axis represents the deviation in turnout rates from long-
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term country averages, the light gray dots indicate above-average turnout rates, and the black 
dots indicate below-average turnout rates (Schafer 2011). Overtime, there is a clear 
downward trend in participation rates, where below-average turnout (black dots) largely 
outnumbers above-average rates (light gray dots). It is undeniable that voter turnout rates 
have declined among many of the established democracies, with the United States serving as 
an epitome of this phenomenon (see also Figure 1). 
Figure 2 Turnout change in twenty democracies, 1946 – 20094 
 
 Not everyone considers the downward trending voter turnout to be a problem. For 
instance, some political theorists regard low turnout as a signal of citizen satisfaction in 
                                                 
4 Note: This graph does not differentiate between countries with compulsory and voluntary voting laws. The 
countries examined include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the 
USA. (Schafer 2011). 
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government and politics. Jones (1954) celebrates the apathetic voter for apathy “may…have 
a beneficial effect on the tone of political life itself” as an “effective counter-force to the 
fanatics who constitute the real danger to liberal democracy.” Hardin (1998) argues that low 
voter turnout shows that the government has not provoked distrust and resistance from its 
citizenry. Other political theorists suggest higher turnout would not change the ultimate 
political outcome of an election. Highton and Wolfinger (2001) perform analyses of survey 
data and find that an increase in turnout would provide little differences in electoral 
outcomes since the preferences of voters hardly differ from those of all citizens. They 
conclude that “universal turnout would bring modest changes,” since the “‘party of non-
voters’ is heterogeneous and “appear[s] well represented by those who vote” (Highton and 
Wolfinger 2001). 
 However, Jones and Highton and Wolfinger fail to consider that low voter turnout 
leaves an important portion of the citizenry out of political discourse, a group of nonvoters 
that is often neither apathetic nor homogeneous with current voters. In fact, low voter 
turnout is correlated with unequal and socio-economically biased turnout, commonly 
referred to as the “socioeconomic voter gap.” Some political pundits argue that, with low 
turnout, the voices of the poor, the young, immigrants, and minorities are largely left out of 
the political process. Powell (1986) found that, of seven European nations and Canada, there 
was a consistent impact of level of education on turnout. Between the highest and lowest 
levels of education, there was a difference in voter turnout of 10 percentage points and a 
consistent increase of 2 to 3 percentage points as education level increased (Powell 1986, 
Lijphart 1998).  
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This phenomenon is particularly true in the United States. In the past U.S. midterm 
election, the Pew Research Center (2014) found that nonvoters are very different 
demographically from voters in that they are younger, more racially and ethnically diverse, 
and are less affluent and less educated (see Figure 3). For instance, when looking at 
education level, we find that 54% of nonvoters have not attended college, while 72% of 
likely voters have completed at least some college. Nonvoters are also less affluent: nearly 
half have family incomes less than $30,000 as compared to the 19% of likely voters with the 
same income level. These demographic differences between nonvoters and likely voters are 
not new in the United States; similar trends were found during the 2010 and 2012 American 
elections (Pew Research Center 2010, Pew Research Center 2012). 
Figure 3 Demographic divides between nonvoters and likely voters,  
United States midterm elections, October 20145 
 
In an article in Bloomberg Business, Orszag (2012) notes that “over the past decades the 
differences between voters and nonvoters have grown significantly larger.” This was 
                                                 
5 Survey conducted from October 15-20, 2014. (Pew Research Center 2014). 
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precipitated by the fact that the “political machines” in the 1950s and 1960s launched local 
mobilization efforts to get individuals to the polls, allowing citizens with more modest 
means and low levels of education to connect with neighborhood institutions and participate 
in national politics. Now, it is much more likely for political parties to employ mass 
mobilization techniques—for instance, social media blasts—which leaves the less affluent 
and less educated out of the picture. 
More importantly, since nonvoters as compared to voters have more diverse 
backgrounds in terms of age, race, affluence, education level, and ethnicity, they also have a 
different set of political priorities and preferences. For instance, those of lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds may have a higher interest in supporting progressive income 
taxes as compared to wealthy citizens. Hill and Leighley (1992) show that class bias in U.S. 
state electorate policy and spending, especially as related to redistribution policies, can be 
explained by the underrepresentation of the poor in the political process. Moreover, low 
levels of democratic participation are associated with higher income inequality and 
considerable class bias in the political process (Mueller and Stratmann 2003, Hicks and 
Swank 1992). According to Lijphart (2001), low and unequal turnout makes it easier for 
politicians “to reduce government aid to the poor than to cut entitlement programs that 
chiefly benefit the middle class.” When turnout numbers shift from low to high, it is likely 
that political attitudes and behavior will change as the poor and the young raise their own set 
of political concerns.  
 Finally, Hill (2006) provides a principled account as to why low voter turnout is bad 
for American democracy on the “level of values.” Since the concept of majority will is a 
central component to democracy, low turnout (especially those as low as 60 percent) may 
10 
 
not accurately represent the preferences of the majority of the population. More importantly, 
the value of political equality is undermined when a disproportionate number of people with 
a particular socioeconomic status have less of a say in the system. From a value perspective, 
low voter turnout “impugns a number of fundamental democratic values,” including 
“population sovereignty, legitimacy, representativeness, political equality, and minimization 
of elite power,” when there is a striking gap in socioeconomic status between voters and 
nonvoters (L. Hill 2006). Overall, low voter turnout presents a problem since fewer citizen 
preferences are registered by the system. The fewer opinions expressed by the electorate, the 
less respective the government can be to the total population. 
2.2 Overview of Compulsory Voting Laws 
 
To fix the low voter turnout problem, some countries have employed compulsory voting 
laws.6  Before discussing whether or not compulsory voting laws effectively increases 
turnout, let us explore how compulsory voting policies are constructed and where they are 
most prevalent. 
Compulsory voting requires that citizens of a particular polity register and attend a 
polling place. As a result of the secret ballot, voters “cannot be compelled to either mark 
their ballot or voter formally,” such that they have “the option of returning blank or spoiled 
ballots,” if desired (L. Hill 2006). Figure 4 shows the distribution of compulsory to voluntary 
voting policies implemented in countries around the world. In 2015, 24 countries have 
                                                 
6 Other mechanisms to bolster voter turnout span the gamut. Lijphart (1998) suggests removing burdensome 
registration requirements, implementing proportional representation, and reducing the complexity and 
frequency of elections to address the problem of voter fatigue. Hill (2006) also suggests ideas from moving 
Election Day to Saturday to making voting booths more accessible, for instance sitting polling places in 
shopping malls. A less divided government will also improve “the relationship between voting and policy 
consequences” (L. Hill, Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting a Viable Solution? 
2006). 
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compulsory voting systems in all eight geographical areas of the world. When looking at the 
ratio of countries that practice compulsory voting to the total countries within a particular 
geographical region, we find that compulsory voting is most commonly practiced in Latin 
America, Western Europe, Oceania, and Asia, with 55%, 19%, 13%, and 12% for their ratios 
respectively. Overall, 13% of the 199 countries with elections practice compulsory voting.  
Figure 4 Number of countries with compulsory and voluntary voting laws 
ordered by geographical area in 20157 
 
 
Figure 5 displays a map of these geographical differences with respect to voting laws. 
There are no compulsory voting laws for countries in North America, Northern Europe, and 
Western and Southern Africa. Four countries do not hold direct elections, or that voters do 
not cast ballots to choose the person, persons, or political party to fill a particular political 
                                                 
7 The countries that have compulsory voting in 2015 include: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Greece, 
Honduras, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nauru, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Singapore, 
Thailand, Turkey, and Uruguay (24 countries). (United Nations 2015, International Institute of Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance 2015a, Pintor and Gratschew 2002). 
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office. Countries also differ in their practice of updating their voting registers, either 
updating the registers on a continuous basis or at specific time-periods, typically, at the time 
of an election. Despite the complex machinery required and high cost, continuous registers 
are much more commonly used than periodic registers (L. Hill 2006). 
Figure 5 Map of countries with compulsory or voluntary voting policies in 20158 
 
 
While Figure 4 and Figure 5 depict the number of countries that practice compulsory 
voting, the simple presence or absence of mandatory voting laws in a constitution is much 
too simplistic to make conclusions about geographical differences, since countries have 
different levels of sanctions imposed on nonvoters. Compulsory voting can be thought of as 
a spectrum, ranging from a symbolic to a strictly enforced law, the latter of which involves a 
government systematically following up on nonvoters and implementing sanctions against 
them. Countries differ principally on their imposition of sanctions as well as their level of 
                                                 
8 Map developed using http://mapchart.net/world.html. (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance 2015a). 
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enforcement to punish citizens who fail to register. The particular types of sanctions include 
the following:9 
 Explanation – The nonvoter has to provide a legitimate reason for failure to vote 
and to avoid further sanctions. 
 Fine – The nonvoter faces a fine, which ranges by country: three Swiss francs in 
Switzerland, 300 – 3,000 schillings in Austria, 200 pounds in Cyprus, 10 – 20 pesos 
in Argentina, 20 soles in Peru, and so forth. 
 Possible Imprisonment – The nonvoter faces imprisonment as a sanction, 
especially after failure or repeated refusal to pay the country-specific fine. While no 
such cases are documented, this is a possibility in Austria, Chile, Egypt, Fiji, and 
Peru, such that courts may impose a prison sentence on the nonvoter. 
 Infringements of Civil Rights or Disenfranchisement – A nonvoter in Belgium, 
for instance, will be disenfranchised after not voting in at least four elections in 15 
years. In Peru, nonvoters are unable to obtain certain goods and services from public 
offices. A nonvoter in Singapore is removed from the voting register until 
reapplication or a legitimate reason is submitted for having not voted. A Bolivian 
nonvoter cannot receive a salary from the bank unless proof is shown of voting. 
 Other – Some sanctions follow none of the following categories. For instance, in 
Belgium, it is hard for a nonvoter to obtain a job in the public sector, while a 
nonvoter in Greece cannot obtain a new passport. In Italy, a nonvoter might receive 
an “innocuous sanction,” where it might for example be difficult to put his or her 
child in childcare. 
                                                 
9 (Gratschew 2002, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015b). 
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Table 1 Compulsory voting and sanctions in select countries10 
Country Type of Sanction a 
Level of 
Enforcement 
Year(s) Introduced 
or Practiced 
Voter Turnout 
Percentage b 
Argentina 1, 2, 4 Weak 1912 82.03 
Australia 1, 2 Strict 1924 94.96 
Austria (Tyrol) 1, 2 Weak 1929 – 2014 82.99 
Austria (Vorarlberg) 2, 3 Weak 1929 – 1992  82.99 
Belgium 1, 2, 4, 5 Strict 1919, 1949 91.80 
Bolivia 4 Not available 1952 83.11 
Brazil 2 Weak N/A 78.32 
Chile 1, 2, 3 Weak 1925 – 2012 80.30 
Congo, Dem. Repub. N/A Not available N/A 63.44 
Costa Rica None Not enforced N/A 74.21 
Cyprus 1, 2 Strict 1960 83.58 
Dominican Republic None Not enforced N/A 69.10 
Ecuador 2 Weak 1936 71.37 
Egypt 1, 2, 3 Not available 1956 42.33 
Fiji 1, 2, 3 Strict 1992 – 2006 78.77 
Gabon N/A Not available N/A 63.98 
Greece 1, 5 Weak 1926 74.94 
Guatemala None Not enforced Till 1990 52.35 
Honduras None Not enforced N/A 68.66 
Italy 5 Not enforced 1945 – 1993 83.59 
Lebanon N/A Not available N/A 43.78 
Liechtenstein 1, 2 Weak N/A 91.28 
Luxembourg 1, 2 Strict N/A 89.53 
Mexico None / 5 Weak N/A 63.03 
Nauru 1, 2 Strict 1965 92.43 
Netherlands 2 Strict 1917 – 1967 73.24 
Panama N/A Not available N/A 71.87 
Paraguay 2 Not available N/A 75.49 
Peru 2, 3 Weak 1933 81.33 
Philippines None Not enforced 1972 – 1986 74.50 
Singapore 4 Strict N/A 93.77 
Switzerland 2 Strict 1904 – 1974  54.95 
Thailand None Not enforced N/A 55.50 
Turkey 1, 2 Weak 1980s 81.63 
Uruguay 2, 4 Strict 1970 81.56 
Venezuela N/A Not enforced Till 1933 77.70 
 
a The type of sanction includes the following: 
1= nonvoter must provide explanation; 
2 = nonvoter faces a fine (amount varies by country); 
3 = possible imprisonment; 
4 = infringement of civil rights or disenfranchisement; 
5 = other (i.e., Belgium makes it harder to get a job while Greece is difficult to obtain a new passport). 
b Voter turnout percentage averaged over 71 years (from 1945 – 2015) and including both first-order and 
second-order elections. 
 
                                                 
10 (Gratschew 2002, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015b). 
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Table 1 shows that, in terms of particular geographical areas of the world, the 
presence and enforcement of sanctions follow particular patterns. All areas outside of North 
America and Central and Eastern Europe have countries with compulsory voting laws and 
attached sanctions. Countries in Latin America, Western Europe, Asia, and Oceania have 
stricter enforcements in practice. The most common sanction is an explanation alone or 
together with a fine. Those countries with some type of sanction have an average turnout 
rate of over 70%, with the exception of Switzerland, which discontinued compulsory voting 
in 1974. Countries with a sanction with strict enforcement have an average voter turnout of 
90%. 
2.3 The Voting Paradox 
 
Another related topic is why citizens even vote. Economists have studied in depth the 
inherent problem in voting: rational abstention. Downs (1957) argues that a citizen’s value 
from voting is very close to zero as a result of having such a small probability of affecting 
the outcome of an election. Downs (1957) presents the “calculus of voting,” where the net 
payoff from voting is p × B – C. In this equation, p is the probability of changing the 
outcome, B is the net-benefit from having the preferred outcome over the outcome that 
results when no vote is given, and C is the cost of voting. Since p is close to zero in a large 
population of citizens, the instrumental benefit of p × B is approximately zero and smaller 
than C, resulting in a negative overall benefit for an individual voter. Overall, a rational 
citizen would not feel compelled to vote, especially since a citizen incurs costs when voting, 
for instance, time and money (Orszag 2012). In fact, rational abstention can explain why the 
socioeconomic voter gap exists, as the opportunity costs to voting are much higher for those 
with lower income. The “voting paradox” describes the fact that despite the economic 
16 
 
prediction of a near-zero voter turnout, a fairly sizeable portion of the population submit 
ballots every November.11 
Compulsory voting changes the Downs’ calculus of voting. When voting is 
mandatory, the probability of someone affecting the outcome of a vote, p, is no longer zero, 
since a coalition of voters with one’s similar interests are all mandated by the law to vote. As 
a result, it is much more likely that the instrumental benefit of voting, p × B, is higher than 
the cost of voting, C, under a compulsory voting system. Hill (2006) argues that compulsory 
voting reduces information uncertainty in voting, where simply by knowing that “other 
voters with similar interests to mine are going to vote overcomes any uncertainty about the 
value of my vote and frees me from having to weight ‘opportunity costs’ against benefits in 
an environment where resources and information are scarce.” For instance, consider a poor, 
unemployed, agoraphobic African American woman. Without mandatory voting, it is 
rational for her to stay at home and preserve her scarce resources, since it highly likely that 
those in her similar circumstance will also not vote and therefore her vote will be fairly 
inconsequential to protect her interests. Mandatory voting takes this “‘prisoner’s dilemma’ 
aspect out of the decision about whether or not to bother voting,” helping coordinate 
individuals within a polity” (L. Hill 2006). Hill (2006) reasons that much in the same way that 
taxation and compulsory schooling solves collective action problems, so too can 
                                                 
11 To solve the voter paradox, economists have either departed from standard utility maximization models or 
assumed that voting gives various forms of utility through “expressive benefits”—the benefits of self-
expression, the pride in participating in a well-functioning democratic static, and the desire to fulfill one’s civil 
duty to vote (Funk 2005). Regarding the last expressive benefit, Knack (1992) and Opp (2001) find that citizens 
that have internalized the social norm that a good citizen should go to the polls are more likely to do so. 
Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) consider a different voter other than an expected utility maximizer: “the minimax 
regret decision maker.” This type of voter finds the errs of his ways in the future, so he chooses to act so as to 
minimize his maximum error over a future time horizon. The minimax regret decision makers will regularly 
vote in elections so as to minimize their future regret of not voting. Funk (2005) argues that citizens also go the 
polls for “signaling purposes,” namely as a result of social pressures and social rewards that serve as an 
“external benefit of norm-adherence.” 
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“compulsory voting be better understood as a coordination necessity in mass societies of 
individuated strangers unable to communicate and coordinate their preferences.” 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
Economists and political theorists have analyzed the impact of mandatory voting on voter 
turnout through various empirical studies. Table 2 shows a snapshot of the various empirical 
studies that examine the relationship between compulsory voting policies and voter turnout, 
with the number of countries examined, years in the study, and main findings. As a whole, 
these studies demonstrate that compulsory voting increases voter participation rates, 
although the scale of the effect of compulsory voting on turnout differs between studies. As 
Blais (2006) puts it, “This pattern has been confirmed by every study of turnout in western 
democracies, and the magnitude of the estimated impact is almost always around 10 to 15 
points… ‘Compulsory voting increases turnout’ can be construed as a well-established 
proposition.” 
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Table 2 Empirical studies on relation between compulsory voting and  
voter turnout12 
Author (Year) 
No. of countries 
(No. of elections) Years in study Results 
Powell (1982) 29 democracies 1960 – 1970 Compulsory voting induces higher turnout 
while voluntary registration reduced turnout. 
Jackman (1987) 19 democracies 1960 – 1980 Compulsory voting increases turnout by 13 
points. 
Franklin (1996) 23 democracies 1961 – 1990 Compulsory voting increases turnout by 6 
to 7 percentage points. 
Blais and 
Dobrzynska 
(1998) 
91 countries  
(324 elections) 
1972 – 1995 Compulsory voting induces an 11-point 
increase in voter turnout. Combining 
various factors socio-economic 
environment, institutional setting, and the 
party system can account for turnout as 
high as 90 percent. 
Norris (2002) 23 democracies 1990 – 2000 Compulsory voting regulations are 
particularly salient in older democracies, 
where turnout is 7.7 points higher as a 
proportion of the voting age population 
and 14.2 points higher as a proportion of 
the registered electorate. 
Blais, Massicotte, 
and Dobrzynska 
(2003) 
61 democracies 
(151 elections) 
1990 – 2001 Compulsory voting induced a 13-point 
increase in turnout, provided there was a 
penalty or sanction for failing to vote. 
Proportional voting systems also induce 
higher turnout in these countries. 
Fornos, Power, 
and Garand 
(2004) 
18 Latin Am. 
countries (85 
parliamentary 
and 70 
presidential) 
1980 – 2000 Compulsory voting laws have a positive 
impact on voter turnout in both Latin 
American elections, accounting for as much 
as a 20-point increase in turnout with the 
presence of enforced sanctions. 
Shafer (2011) 90 democracies 2001 – 2010 Countries with strict enforcement 
consistently have high turnout rates, with 
an average turnout of 24 points higher than 
those countries with voluntary voting. In 
his multivariate analysis, he finds that 
average turnout is 10 points and 18 points 
higher in countries with weak enforcement 
and strict enforcement, respectively, as 
compared to voluntary voting systems. 
                                                 
12 (Jackman 1987, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Blais, Massicotte and Dobrzynska 2003, Blais 2006, Schafer 
2011, Fornos, Power and Garand 2004, Norris 2002). 
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As shown in Table 2, the seminal studies on mandatory voting focused principally on 
democratic countries. Starting with Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), scholars increased the 
sample size of countries to greater than 30 or examined only a subset of countries, such as 
those in the Latin America. More recent literature, such as Fornos, Power, and Garand 
(2004) and Shafer (2011), examine the kinds of sanctions that must accompany compulsory 
voting legislation for them to efficient as well as how strictly these sanctions should be 
enforced. For instance, Schafer (2011) finds that even if compulsory voting is weakly 
enforced, there is still a higher average turnout though there is a considerable range of 
participation rates within this group (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6 Average voter turnout rates in 90 democratic countries,  
2001 – 201013 
 
                                                 
13 a = Percentage of registered voters. CV = compulsory voting. 
The sample comprises all countries that Freedom House rated at least as “free” and not worse than “partially 
free” for half of the years between 2001 and 2010. (Schafer 2011). 
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 These studies, however, have a fair amount of limitations. First, all the studies in 
Table 2 employ cross-sectional time-series models, meaning that each observation is a 
separate election, associated with one country in one year. Their models fail to distinguish 
each observation as a specific country (entity) in a specific year (time) as a panel regression 
might take into account. As a result, the studies suffer from omitted variable bias, since their 
studies do not account for variables that might differ between countries (entity-fixed effects) 
and over the years (time-fixed effects).  
Additionally, the studies limit the sample size of countries to below 90 (often below 
30) over a short 20- to 30-year time horizon. This makes it challenging to discern if the study 
results can be applied directly to the United States in the present-day, since conclusions 
might apply to only a narrow range of countries and over a specific decade in the past. 
Another weakness is that prior studies often confound correlation with causation. 
Countries with mandatory voting policies are very different culturally and politically than 
those without these policies, so it difficult to ascertain if higher turnout in countries with 
compulsory voting can really be attributed to the law itself or differences in a country’s 
political or economic climate. None of the studies directly analyze voter turnout before and 
after the imposition of compulsory voting legislation (or before and after the annulment of 
such legislation), which would control for country-specific differences.  
Finally, studies, such as Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) and Blais, Massicotte, and 
Dobrzynska (2003), leave the United States out of their sample because of missing data. This 
is highly problematic because the U.S. is an influential country with a low voter turnout 
despite a high GDP per capita and population size. Using their models, we would predict a 
high voter turnout rate for the U.S. of over 100 percent, even without compulsory voting.  
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Chapter 4 
Preliminary Data Analysis 
In my study, I correct the limitations of prior literature with both a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of compulsory voting. In the qualitative section that follows, I compare 
turnout before and after the adoption or abandonment of mandatory voting laws. 
4.1 Case Study: Australia 
 
Australia is an interesting country to focus on given its consistently high rates of compliance 
under a compulsory voting system. Figure 7 shows that when compulsory voting was 
implemented 1924, voter turnout jumped to 91 percent, which is 32-point increase from the 
previous election in 1922. Since the imposition of compulsory voting, voter turnout has 
remained high at an average turnout of 95 percent from 1925 to 2013. In comparison, the 
average voter turnout prior to the imposition of compulsory voting was 64 percent from 
1901 to 1922, which represents a 31-point difference.  
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Figure 7  Voter turnout in Australian parliamentary elections, 1901 – 201314 
 
Australia imposes two sanctions on citizens who fail to vote—an explanation is 
required and a fine between $10 and $170 is imposed if an insufficient explanation is offered 
(Australian Electoral Commission 2014).15 Interestingly, the imposition of these sanctions 
does not necessarily need to result in rigorous punishment in order to be effective. For 
instance, through “‘please explain’ letters,” Australia has an honor system whereby abstainers 
give “valid and sufficient” reasons in order to avoid penalties for not voting (L. Hill 2006). 
Abstainers are rarely fined in practice. Less than one percent of the Australian electorate face 
                                                 
14 (Sharman and University of Western Australia n.d., International Institute of Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance 2015a). 
15 According to the Australian Electoral Commission, all non-voters that do not “provide a valid and sufficient 
reason for failing to vote” pay a $20 penalty. If one fails to pay the $20 penalty, the matter may be referred to a 
court hearing, in which case the fine could be as high as “$170 plus court costs and a criminal conviction may 
be recorded against you” (Australian Electoral Commission 2014). 
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a fine or court commitment in a given election period (L. Hill 2006).16 Overall, administering 
sanctions is not a huge burden on the Australian Electoral Commission. 
An explanation of why Australia has such high rates of compliance with low rates of 
punishment can be traced to two reasons. First, in this system, voting is easily accessible and 
failure to vote is often more troublesome than voting. Second, when the law requires that 
people vote, a norm of universal participation is generated and reinforced. As Hasen (1996) 
explains, “[L]aw may be the pathway to order, not the obstacle to it,” through the emergence 
of adaptive social norms that “shape preferences” and “change tastes.” Since laws show a 
consensus of acceptable behavior in a community, citizens often treat the law the final say. 
As such, a law such as compulsory voting can cause people to internalize a preference for a 
particular type of behavior. This type of norm shaping is shown in Australia, where most 
citizens approve of compulsory voting “not merely because they feel bound to obey the 
laws” but because they think the “law and its entailed obligation as a reasonable imposition 
on personal autonomy, in much the same way that people feel obligated to stop at red lights” 
(L. Hill 2006). Galston (2011) notes that Australians see voting as obligatory, given that 
roughly 2 to 3 percent of ballots are intentionally spoiled or completed randomly in 
resistance of the law. Simply having the law of compulsory voting alone is not enough to 
ensure turnout or build a particular norm. The law must be accompanied by some type of 
sanction in order to have its desired effect. As Hirczy (1994) notes, democratic regimes with 
sanctions for nonvoters increase voter turnout by around 10 to 13 points as compared to 
                                                 
16 This is equally true in other countries with imposed sanctions. For instance, Belgium has prosecuted less than 
a quarter of a percent of nonvoters (L. Hill, Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting a 
Viable Solution? 2006). 
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those that do not, suggesting that the law is recognized as obligatory once penalties, even 
those that are negligible, are prescribed.  
While compulsory voting might appear to be a tedious system to administer that 
requires a heavy financial burden on the public purse, in reality, mandatory voting is not 
extremely costly. In Australia, the cost of the compulsory voting system is relatively small at 
$5 per vote (L. Hill 2006).17 The Australian Electoral Commission has tried to limit the 
citizen costs of voting by actively assisting with registration, ensuring that there are polling 
booths within close proximity to all citizens, holding elections on Saturday, expanding voting 
the absentee population, and increasing technology through mobile polling and postal 
voting. The Commission is thereby able to ensure that voters do not forego too much when 
voting, minimizing the opportunity and transaction costs. While opponents to mandatory 
voting could argue that these costs incurred by the Australian government are too 
burdensome and expensive, even if they are as low as $5 per vote, a high cost is not a 
sufficient reason to reject compulsory voting in solving the low turnout problem. In fact, 
democracy is an expensive and cumbersome process that is often well worth its process with 
a well-functioning polity and engaged citizenry. The fact that mandatory voting increased 
Australian voter turnout by upwards of 30 percentage points is reason enough to justify the 
costs incurred by the Australian Electoral Commission in making the registration and voting 
process relatively painless. 
 
  
                                                 
17 The dollar value of the vote was calculated from Hill’s correspondence with Gay Young, information officer 
at the Australian Electoral Office in May 2012. 
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4.2 Case Study: The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands presents another fascinating example to understand the relationship 
between law and norms with respect to compulsory voting, given that Dutch elections 
switched from compulsory to voluntary voting.  
Figure 8 Voter turnout in Dutch parliamentary elections, 1946 – 201218  
 
 
Figure 8 shows that before the compulsory voting law was repealed in the Netherlands, 
voter turnout was extremely high with an average of 95 percent between 1946 and 1967. 
Immediately after compulsory voting was abandoned in 1970, voter turnout plummeted to 
79 percent in the election of 1971, representing a 16-point drop from its 95 percent level in 
1967. As Hill (2006) puts it, “As soon as the law was repealed, turnout fell immediately and 
                                                 
18 (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015a). 
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drastically.” Overall, the average voter turnout in the Netherlands after the abandonment of 
compulsory voting has hovered around 80 percent, with the lowest turnout in 1998 at 73 
percent. In contrast, the Dutch compulsory voting system boasted an average turnout rate of 
95 percent, which is 15 points higher.  
In the Netherlands prior to 1970, the fine for nonvoters was relatively modest at 
around $5, and only a small percentage of abstainers were brought to court and prosecuted 
after any given election. Irwin (1974) found that in 1966, only 577 of 400,000 nonvoters 
were even brought to court. This suggests that the high turnout figures were not the result of 
fear of severe penalties for violation. Instead, “obedience was simply recognition that that 
was the law and the law should be obeyed. When the law was changed, behavior also 
changed” (Irwin 1974). Hill (2006) adds that in cases where compulsory voting is “applied 
systematically and without zealotry,” it can serve as an effective “surrogate for the social 
norm of voting.” 
 
4.3 Switching between Voluntary and Compulsory Systems 
 
After examining the particular situations within Australia and the Netherlands, a question 
remains whether these trends can be generalized across all across countries. In other words, 
does the pattern in Australia and the Netherlands stand true for other countries? Does the 
adoption compulsory voting cause voter turnout to rise, and similarly, does the 
abandonment of compulsory voting cause turnout to fall? 
 To examine these questions further, I first modeled the impact that a change from a 
voluntary to a compulsory voting system had on voter turnout. Figure 9 displays voter 
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turnout in two countries—Turkey and Uruguay—before and after the adoption of 
compulsory voting, with election 0 representing the first election since the passage of 
mandatory voting policies.  
Figure 9 Voter turnout in select countries before and after the adoption of  
compulsory voting19 
  
 
In Turkey, compulsory voting increased voter turnout from 70 percent to 92 percent, 
representing a 22-point increase. Before the adoption of compulsory voting, the average 
voter turnout in Turkey was 74 percent. Since the early 1980s with the passage of mandatory 
voting laws, average turnout in Turkish elections increased by 13 points to 87 percent. 
Similarly, in the Uruguayan elections before and after a compulsory voting system was 
implemented, turnout was 74 percent and 88 percent, respectively. On average, turnout in 
the years preceding and following the passage of mandatory voting laws was 70 and 88 
                                                 
19 (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015a). 
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percent, respectively. In other words, mandatory voting increased average turnout by 18 
points. Overall, voter turnout before and after the adoption of compulsory voting exhibits a 
similar trend found in Australia, although the scale of the increase varies by country based 
on regional and cultural differences.  
Next, I modeled the impact that a change from a compulsory to a voluntary system 
had on a voter turnout. Figure 10 shows voter turnout in six countries before and after the 
abandonment of compulsory voting, with election 0 representing the first election since the 
annulment of compulsory voting laws.  
Figure 10 Voter turnout in select countries before and after the abandonment of  
compulsory voting20 
 
                                                 
20 (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015a). 
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When comparing the elections right before and after the abandonment of 
voting, voter turnout dropped by 6 points in Austria, 11 points in Guatemala, 3 points in 
Italy, 16 points in Netherlands, 4 points in Switzerland, and 21 points in Venezuela. 
Although the Netherlands has one of the highest drops in voter turnout with the 
abandonment of mandatory voting policies, the trend in voter turnout is similar across every 
country observed: voter turnout consistently drops with the abandonment of compulsory 
voting policies. 
Figure 11 extends the voter turnout trends in Figure 10, by capturing the average 
voter turnout in the selected countries when their political systems had either compulsory or 
voluntary voting systems.  
Figure 11 Average voter turnout in select countries with a switch from 
compulsory to voluntary voting systems21 
 
                                                 
21 (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015a). 
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Outside of Guatemala, which has a change in average turnout of 8 points, all other countries 
experience a drop in average voter turnout in the double digits. In fact, Austria and 
Venezuela experience a change in average voter turnout of over 20 points when the system 
switches from mandatory to voluntary voting. 
The trends found within Australia and the Netherlands remain consistent. In order 
to explore what the impact compulsory voting would have on the United States’ voter 
turnout, I now turn to modeling the relation between voter turnout and mandatory voting, 
controlling for various factors from the socioeconomic environment to the institutional 
setting to the party system. A multivariate regression model allows me to control for various 
factors that might also contribute to higher or lower compulsory voter, which makes for a 
better point estimate of how much turnout would shift in the United States under a 
compulsory voting system.  
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Chapter 5 
Data 
5.1 Overview of the Data 
 
To build a model to find causal correlations between voter turnout and laws, I rely on one 
major dataset for my analysis, which provides voter turnout data from national presidential, 
parliamentary, and European parliamentary elections since 1945. The data is provided by the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an 
intergovernmental organization that aims to support democracy worldwide through the 
provision of knowledge, assistance in democratic reform, and influence on policies and 
politics (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015c). This dataset 
is widely used by cross-national research on compulsory voting and is well known as the 
most comprehensive global collection of voter turnout statistics (Fornos, Power and Garand 
2004, Schafer 2011). Table 8 in the Appendix provides a description of variables in the 
IDEA voter turnout database, the majority of which are used as key variables in my model. 
 I used two additional data sources to add further explanatory variables to my model 
from population to per capita GDP to level of democracy. The first of these data sources is 
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the Penn World Tables (PWT) constructed at the University of Pennsylvania that covers real 
national-accounts data (Summers and Heston 2015). Unlike other databases, such as the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, PWT covers a longer time period that is 
useful to compare country productivity over a range of time. PWT combines the prices 
within each country for expenditure categories to determine an overall relative price level, 
known as the country’s purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP helps to estimate the exchange 
rate between two currencies, such that when country’s GDP is converted into another 
country’s currency, it is standardized instead of relying on fluctuating market exchange rates. 
The second of the data sources is Freedom House, an organization that aims to defend 
human rights and promulgate democratic change by focusing on three pillars of “analysis, 
advocacy, and action” in the support of basic political rights and civil liberties (Freedom 
House 2015). Freedom House developed a comprehensive database that measures the 
democracy and political freedom within countries. To determine the level of democracy 
within a country, there are two separate scales for political rights and civil liberties, both of 
which are measured from 1 (high freedom) to 7 (low freedom). For instance, Denmark has a 
combined average score of 1, indicating it is a well-functioning democracy, while Kenya has 
a combined average score of 6, suggesting that citizens lack basic political liberties. 
 I also added dummy variables to my model to capture geographical differences 
between countries. The United Nations Statistical Yearbook produces a yearly report that 
references standardized regional groupings of countries, primarily based on the continent in 
which the country is housed. For example, Cameroon is located in the sub-region of Middle 
Africa in the geographical area of Africa. 
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5.2 Coverage 
 
The original dataset from the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
includes 2771 elections from 199 countries over the time period of 1945 to 2015 
(International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015a). Within the IDEA 
dataset, 35 of the countries have had compulsory voting at some point during the 71-year 
period, 24 of which employed compulsory voting for the entire period and 11 of which 
employed compulsory voting for part of the time period (Table 1 lists the 35 countries).  
Since the IDEA dataset included presidential, parliamentary, and EU parliamentary 
elections, I have limited my sample to include the major elections within countries—
presidential elections if a country is a federal republic or parliamentary elections if a country 
follows a parliamentary system. For instance, United States as a federal republic has both 
presidential and congressional elections, so I only included the presidential elections. 
Germany, on the other hand, is a federal parliamentary republic that includes both 
parliamentary and EU parliamentary elections, so I only considered the impact of the 
parliamentary elections. Additionally, other explanatory variables, such as per capita GDP 
from the Penn World Tables or level of democracy from Freedom House Ratings, had some 
missing observations. In these cases, I omitted these particular elections from the dataset.  
Overall, the data used in my model includes 143 countries from 1950 to 2011, 
covering 1051 elections. (See Table 9 in the Appendix for a list of countries used in this 
study.) Over the 62-year period, 31 countries had compulsory has mandatory voting at some 
point, with 23 countries consistently practicing compulsory voting laws, 2 countries 
switching from voluntary to compulsory voting systems, and 6 countries switching from 
compulsory to voluntary voting systems. (The countries that switch between compulsory and 
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voluntary systems are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10.) Figure 12 graphically shows the 
number and share of countries with compulsory versus voluntary systems used in my model. 
Over 20 percent of the countries analyzed had some type of compulsory voting system from 
1950 to 2011. 
Figure 12 Number (share) of countries with compulsory versus voluntary 
systems in model, 1950 – 201122 
 
5.3 Data Limitations 
 
Although the sample of countries is of a large sample size, including over 70 percent of the 
countries with democratic elections, the number of countries with compulsory voting is 
fairly small. This makes it particularly difficult to assess if a sizeable voter turnout can be 
attributed to compulsory voting or various cultural or regional factors. Moreover, countries 
differ wildly in their political environment and stability, socioeconomic status of its citizens, 
                                                 
22 (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015a). 
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demographic makeup of the population, and cultural attitude. While I have controlled for 
some of these factors in my model, there are numerous factors that differ between countries 
that can shape voter turnout. 
 Another major limitation in the data is that there are an unbalanced number of 
elections per country. For instance, the sample includes 12 elections for the United States 
from 1964 to 2008, while it only includes two elections for Sudan in 1996 and 2010. This 
makes it particularly hard to compare between countries because there are inherently more 
observations (elections) in the dataset for some countries and less for others. Additionally, 
the elections within each country also fall on different years and include different gaps 
between elections. The United States has presidential elections every 4 years, but Senegal has 
presidential elections between 5 and 7 years apart.23 With elections falling on different years, 
it is hard to isolate particular cross-country effects on voter turnout in a particular year. 
Different gaps between elections could shape whether or not citizens vote – infrequent 
elections could boost turnout while frequent elections could induce political apathy. 
  
                                                 
23 The reduction of the Senegalese presidential term from 7 to 5 years was due to a constitutional amendment 
in 2001. 
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Chapter 6 
Methodology and Variable Specification 
The models used in the majority of the literature are cross-sectional in nature, where turnout 
across a series of elections is taken as a function of the levels of various explanatory variables 
(Jackman 1987, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Blais, Massicotte and Dobrzynska 2003, Blais 
2006, Schafer 2011, Fornos, Power and Garand 2004). These scholars employ a pooled 
cross-section model, where the units of analysis are individual elections. This is particularly 
superior to a model where mean turnout is analyzed over the mean levels of independent 
variables and each observation is one nation. As Fornos, Power, and Garand (2004) explain, 
the problem with looking at country means is that “there is co-variation in turnout and key 
independent variables that occurs within countries overtime yet is hidden by the process of 
aggregating the data through the calculation of means for each variable.” Thus, I begin my 
analysis by applying a pooled cross-sectional time-series model, where turnout in each i-th 
country and each t-th year is a function of independent variables at the time of the particular 
election-year. I add to these models by including a larger selection of countries (143 as 
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opposed to roughly 50 countries in other studies) over a longer time period (71 years as 
opposed to 20-30 years). 
 Next, since we know that voter turnout is bounded by 0 and 1, I applied a logistic 
specification to the cross-section model. Since my voter turnout dependent variable was 
originally scaled from 0 to 100 to represent the percentage of registered voters that voted, I 
divided this variable by 100 to bound it by 0 and 1 in a logistic specification. Additionally, I 
linearized the logistic function. Since the standard command on regression packages is to 
estimate a linear regression, I performed the following transformation to linearize the model 
and estimate all the relevant regression coefficients. 
The following equation represents a logistic specification with    representing the 
constant term,    representing the regression coefficient for the parameter of interest,   
representing the parameter of interest,    representing a vector of regression coefficients, 
and   representing a vector of regressors:  
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Dividing   by    , we get the following: 
 
   
 
               
                 
  
                 
 
 
 
   
 
               
 
 
 
   
                 
Finally, if we take the natural log of both sides of the equation, we get a standard linear 
equation on the right side: 
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)    (               ) 
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)               
In order to understand the meaning of the regression coefficients, I graphed the relationship 
between a regressor and the dependent variable, with and without the parameter of interest 
of compulsory voting. 
In my second model, I used an entity- and time-fixed effects model, since my data 
was structured with n different country entities observed at T time periods. As noted in the 
section on data limitations, since some countries have fewer elections recorded than other 
countries, this involves an unbalanced panel. With entity-fixed effects, I can control for 
omitted variables that vary across entities but not overtime. Similarly, with time-fixed effects, 
I can control omitted variables that vary across time but not between entities. Combined, an 
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entity- and time-fixed effects regression model eliminates omitted variable bias arising from 
both unobserved variables that are constant across countries and overtime (Stock and 
Watson 2011). This is significant because cross-sectional studies used by other scholars fail 
to account for omitted variable bias that might occur between countries or over the time 
horizon examined. 
6.1 Empirical Framework 
 
In the pooled cross-sectional time-series model, I apply a simple Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression to model the differences between voluntary and compulsory voting 
systems. Thus, 
                        
 Here,    represents the constant,    is the regression coefficient for the 
regressor   , and    is the error term. For the linear specification,    represents the 
dependent variable or voter turnout. For the logistic specification, the dependent variable 
or    is    (
 
   
) where   is voter turnout bounded between 0 and 1. All regressions have 
heteroskedastic robust standard errors. 
 In the entity- and time-fixed effects panel model, I use the following empirical 
framework: 
                                                        
Here,   from 0 to   represents the country entities;   from 0 to   represents the years; and 
    is the value of the first regressor for country   in time period  ,       is the second 
41 
 
regressor and so forth. The model is represented using      country binary indicators and 
    time binary indicators. 
6.2 Variable Specification 
 
The dependent variable, voter turnout, is measured in two ways: turnout in parliamentary 
elections and in presidential elections. Parliamentary elections involve the lower house 
elections in bicameral legislatures. I only included parliamentary elections in cases where they 
are the highest-level election in a particular country, for instance in Australia and Germany. 
Additionally, turnout is calculated as the percentage of the ballots cast over the registered 
population. This is a better measure than a measure of turnout over the voting age 
population as “we do not have good data on the percentage of residents who are aliens of 
voting age, and cannot systematically adjust our turnout data to remove them” (Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998). Instead, similar to Franklin (1996), Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), and 
Fornos, Power, and Garand (2004), I look at voter turnout as a percentage of those 
registered on the electoral list. 
 To understand what affects voters’ predisposition to cast votes during an election, I 
include the following independent variables in my two models. These variables are broken 
into three groups of factors: socioeconomic environment, institutional setting, and party 
system. These groupings are commonly used by other scholars (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, 
Blais, Massicotte and Dobrzynska 2003, Blais 2006, Fornos, Power and Garand 2004). 
Socioeconomic Environment 
Levels of per capita GDP (log). The values of per capita GDP are reported in millions of 2005 
dollars every year for each country according to data provided by University of 
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Pennsylvania’s Penn World Tables. GDP is measured by looking at country expenditures at 
chained purchasing power parities (PPPs). I predict that levels of per capita GDP will be 
positively related to voter turnout levels, since economic development makes a citizenry 
more engaged and informed in the political process. It is also possible that the relationship 
between per capita GDP and voter turnout is non-linear because over a certain threshold of 
economic development, there is no additional impact on turnout. I consider these 
implications in the logistic specification. 
Level of population (log). Next, I include levels of population as reported in millions by 
the University of Pennsylvania’s Penn World Tables. I predict that the relationship between 
country population and turnout will be negative as voting is more likely to occur in smaller 
communities where political life is more personal and close-knit. On the other hand, larger 
communities, which tend to have citizenry that is more impersonal and distant, will have 
lower turnout. 
Geographic areas of the world. To control for differences between specific geographic 
areas of the world, I included six dummy variables based on seven geographic regions. These 
regions included Oceania; Africa; Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe; Asia; Latin 
America; Western Europe; and North America and the Caribbean. Countries were divided in 
geographical areas according to common groupings established by the United Nations 
Statistical Yearbook. Given that Oceania is comprised of two major countries with large 
turnout numbers, Australia and New Zealand, I predict that turnout will be significantly 
higher in this geographical area. 
Other considerations. I considered two additional socio-economic variables that I 
ultimately decided to leave out of my model: population density and levels of illiteracy. For 
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population density, turnout is purported to be lower in less densely populated countries as 
people are less exposed to group pressures to vote and are more difficult to mobilize. 
However, since large populations are concentrated around major cities within a country, I 
believe that a country’s overall population density does not accurately capture this 
phenomenon. For instance, if we take the population density of the United States, the 
majority of people live on either the West or East Coasts. While an individual in a small 
town in Kansas may be less predisposed to vote because fewer individuals talk about politics, 
an individual in San Francisco or New York City is more likely to vote given large political 
rallies and efforts to mobilize voters. Much in the same way that the United States does not 
have a homogenous population density, I reasoned other countries would exhibit a similar 
pattern, so I decided to drop this variable from my model. For levels of illiteracy, I believe 
that voting is not a very demanding form of political activity, such that minimal levels of 
reading and comprehension are required. Additionally, other models that included this 
variable did not find it to be significant (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Blais, Massicotte and 
Dobrzynska 2003, Blais 2006, Fornos, Power and Garand 2004). 
Institutional Setting 
Compulsory voting. I relied on simple binary variable to measure compulsory voting laws, with 
1 representing country-year cases where compulsory voting laws were present and 0 
otherwise. Unlike some scholars, who rely on a scale to capture compulsory voting, I 
decided to go with the simpler model, given the small sample of countries with any 
compulsory voting laws. Moreover, given that some countries in my model abandoned 
compulsory voting during the time period, it is ambiguous as to what types of sanctions or 
enforcement levels their governments previously employed in the 1950s. Since the data for 
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compulsory voting laws is readily available by the Institute of Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA), I believe that using the simple binary variable would be more accurate. I 
predict that compulsory voting laws will boost turnout significantly, given the findings of 
other past studies. 
Degree of democracy. To capture differences in political freedom between countries, I 
used the Freedom House Ratings of degree of democracy, which measures the political 
rights and civil liberties within particular countries. Since Freedom House measures both 
political rights and civil liberties on a scale from 1 (high freedom) to 7 (low freedom), I averaged 
these two scales to capture the overall degree of democracy within a country. I expect that 
this variable will be positive, since turnout should be higher when the degree of democracy is 
higher in a particular country-year case. 
Number of years in democracy. It is expected that when a country first becomes a 
democracy, turnout will be higher since a citizenry is excited to vote, suggesting that the 
longer a country has been a democracy, the lower the turnout. Despite this hypothesis, I 
decided to exclude this variable in my model for the following reasons: first, some countries 
switched between democratic and undemocratic alternatives making a simple continuous 
variable difficult to decipher, and second, despite having democratic elections, corruption 
within certain countries suppresses turnout (i.e., Afghanistan or the Islamic Republic of 
Iran). Instead, I used the Freedom House Ratings to determine the degree of democracy 
within country-year cases, measuring both the level of political rights and civil liberties that 
would make it easier for citizens to vote. 
45 
 
Party System 
Type of electoral system. I included three dummy variables according to a country’s particular 
type of electoral system. This data was provided by the Institute of Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA). Countries employ four different types of electoral systems: 
Plurality/Majority Systems, Proportional Representation Systems, Mixed Systems, and Other 
Systems. I predict that turnout will be higher in proportional representation (PR) systems, 
since there are a greater number of parties, which increases the number of options afforded 
to voters, and PR elections are generally more competitive (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, 
Fornos, Power and Garand 2004). 
Closeness of election. Although I would have liked to measure the closeness of an 
election by taking the difference in the vote share for top-two contenders, data was not 
readily available for this variable going back to the 1950s. 
6.3 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables covered in this study. All variables with 
the exception of degree of democracy from the Freedom House Ratings have 1,051 
observations. When degree of democracy is included within a regression model, the 
particular country-year observations with missing observations are omitted. Several of the 
variables are binary variables, meaning country-year observations are marked with a 1 if the 
specification is relevant or 0 otherwise. For these variables, means represent the proportion 
of the sample that meets the condition. For example, a mean of 0.186 for Asia means that 
18.6% of the country-year observations in this sample are located in Asia.  
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Table 3 Summary statistics for variables covered in study 
Variables N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Voter turnout 1,051 74.04 14.75 2.730 102.6 
Compulsory voting* 1,051 0.288 0.453 0 1 
GDP per capita (log) 1,051 8.799 1.131 5.645 11.21 
Population (log) 1,051 1.966 1.827 -2.823 7.097 
Degree of Democracy 885 2.497 1.674 0 7 
Asia* 1,051 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Africa* 1,051 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Central, Eastern, & Southern Europe* 1,051 0.136 0.343 0 1 
Latin America* 1,051 0.180 0.384 0 1 
Western Europe* 1,051 0.187 0.390 0 1 
Oceania* 1,051 0.0476 0.213 0 1 
PR System* 1,051 0.526 0.500 0 1 
Mixed System* 1,051 0.168 0.374 0 1 
Plurality/Maj. System* 1,051 0.277 0.448 0 1 
Note: An asterisk symbol next to a variable signifies that the variable is a binary. 
 
The average voter turnout across all 1,051 observations is 74.04%. Interestingly, two 
countries have a voter turnout percentage of over 100%, which signifies that more people 
showed up to the polls than were registered in the books. The country-year observations 
with the minimum and maximum GDP per capita are Nigeria in 1999 and Luxembourg in 
2009, respectively. For levels of population, the minimum and maximum country-year 
observations are Bermuda in 1989 and India in 2009. Since the average Freedom House 
Rating is roughly 2.5, this indicates that the majority of the countries have fairly high political 
rights and civil liberties, since a rating of 1-2 is a high level of democracy. For specific 
geographic areas, 19% of the observations are located in Asia; 17% in Africa; 14% in 
Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe; 18% in Latin America; 19% in Western Europe; 5% 
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in Oceania; and the remainder in North America and the Caribbean. Finally, the majority of 
country-year observations employ a proportional representation electoral system. 
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Chapter 7 
Results 
7.1 Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Model 
 
I begin my analysis with a pooled cross-sectional time-series model to mimic the empirical 
models used by other scholars. 
Linear Specification 
Table 4 shows the results of several regressions under a pooled cross-sectional time-series 
model. In my first model, I regress compulsory voting laws on voter turnout. In each 
subsequent model, I add independent variables to control for the effect of differences in the 
socioeconomic environment, institutional setting, and party system within each country. 
 
49 
 
Table 4 Parameter estimates for pooled cross-sectional time-series models of 
turnout with linear specification, 1950 – 2011 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables vt vt vt vt vt 
            
comp 7.673*** 7.445*** 6.233*** 6.395*** 7.658*** 
 
(0.977) (0.932) (1.090) (1.297) (1.358) 
ln_gdp_pc 
 
3.809*** 3.554*** 3.281*** 3.402*** 
  
(0.373) (0.469) (0.600) (0.596) 
ln_pop 
 
-0.597*** -0.633** -0.578** -0.636** 
  
(0.231) (0.260) (0.272) (0.275) 
fhav 
  
-0.232 -0.0232 0.0465 
   
(0.330) (0.358) (0.357) 
asia 
   
0.766 2.040 
    
(1.965) (2.145) 
africa 
   
2.704 3.085 
    
(2.206) (2.253) 
ces_europe 
   
-0.268 -0.852 
    
(1.916) (2.235) 
latam 
   
-0.0903 -1.407 
    
(2.078) (2.316) 
west_europe 
   
4.326** 3.718* 
    
(1.961) (2.220) 
oceania 
   
13.18*** 12.48*** 
    
(2.602) (2.701) 
elecsys_PR 
    
12.55*** 
     
(2.778) 
elecsys_mixed 
    
12.25*** 
     
(2.874) 
elecsys_plur 
    
11.87*** 
     
(2.825) 
Intercept 71.83*** 39.55*** 41.69*** 41.52*** 28.30*** 
 
(0.525) (3.349) (4.673) (5.865) (6.515) 
      N 1,051 1,051 885 885 885 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.148 0.135 0.173 0.193 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
In model (1), I regressed compulsory voting on voter turnout. The coefficient for 
compulsory voting, 7.673, is significant and represents the result of a Welch t-test with 
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unequal variances.24 The interpretation of this coefficient is that mandatory voting increases 
voter turnout by 7.7 percentage points. While model (1) shows there is a positive 
relationship between compulsory voting and voter turnout, the model fails to control for 
other variables that can differ from each country-year observation. In each subsequent 
model, I add a few more independent variables to see impact on the regression coefficients. 
In model (2), with the inclusion of GDP per capita and population controls, the coefficient 
for compulsory voting decreases to 7.445 but remains significant, suggesting that 
compulsory voting policies increase voter turnout by 7.4 points. In models (3) and (4), the 
coefficient for compulsory voting drops to 6, yet remains statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  
Model (5) is the one with the best fit, given the highest adjusted R2 value and highest 
number of significant variables. In this model, the coefficient on compulsory voting is highly 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Countries that include compulsory voting policies 
boost turnout by 7.7 points, on average, with a 95% confidence interval between 6.3 and 
9.02 points. Other significant variables in Model (5) at the 1% level include GDP per capita 
(log), Oceania, proportional representation system, mixed system, and plurality/majority 
system. At the 5% level, population (log) is also significant. An increase of log of GDP per 
                                                 
24
 The Welch t-test with unequal variances is as follows: 
  
( ̅   ̅)         
√  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Here,  ̅ represents the mean turnout for the sample of countries with compulsory voting policies,  ̅ represents 
the mean turnout for the sample of countries without the inclusion of mandatory voting,    represents the 
standard deviation of each group, and   represents the sample size of each group. The null hypothesis,   , is 
that       or that the mean turnout in countries with and without mandatory voting is the same. Since the t-
statistic is significantly large, we can reject the null hypothesis that the mean turnout is equivalent in countries 
with and without compulsory voting. 
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capita by 1 (or an increase in GDP of $5.34 under an average population of 7 million) results 
in a 3.4-point increase in voter turnout. Increasing population by 10 million drops turnout by 
1.5 points. Finally, an electoral system with a proportional representation, plurality/majority, 
or mixed system increases turnout by roughly 12 points. It is important to note that the 
degree of democracy, as measured by Freedom House Ratings, is not significant at any level 
in any of the linear models. Although my model includes a larger sample of countries over a 
longer time period, the results are similar to other linear cross-sectional studies (Jackman 
1987, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Blais, Massicotte and Dobrzynska 2003, Blais 2006, 
Schafer 2011, Fornos, Power and Garand 2004).  
Logistic Specification 
To understand if voter turnout is better modeled under a logistic specification, I performed 
several regressions with the dependent variable as    (
 
   
) where   is voter turnout 
bounded between 0 and 1 (see Table 5). By linearizing the logistic expression, I could easily 
estimate the regression coefficients in each model. However, with a logistic specification, the 
magnitude of the coefficients cannot be interpreted directly. To better interpret the 
coefficients within the regressions, I graphed the relationship between GDP per capita (log) 
and voter turnout, under different population levels and different compulsory voting laws, as 
shown in Figure 13. 
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Table 5 Parameter estimates for pooled cross-sectional time-series models of 
turnout with logistic specification, 1950 – 2011 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables vt_new vt_new vt_new vt_new vt_new 
            
comp 0.539*** 0.526*** 0.424*** 0.480*** 0.550*** 
 
(0.0601) (0.0577) (0.0664) (0.0777) (0.0813) 
ln_gdp_pc 
 
0.215*** 0.218*** 0.194*** 0.199*** 
  
(0.0231) (0.0285) (0.0359) (0.0357) 
ln_pop 
 
-0.0385*** -0.0440*** -0.0403** -0.0437*** 
  
(0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0163) (0.0165) 
fhav 
  
0.0164 0.0297 0.0319 
   
(0.0201) (0.0215) (0.0214) 
asia 
   
0.0765 0.193 
    
(0.118) (0.129) 
africa 
   
0.254* 0.296** 
    
(0.132) (0.135) 
ces_europe 
   
0.0842 0.0888 
    
(0.115) (0.134) 
latam 
   
-0.0593 -0.0967 
    
(0.125) (0.139) 
west_europe 
   
0.332*** 0.329** 
    
(0.118) (0.133) 
oceania 
   
1.023*** 1.023*** 
    
(0.156) (0.162) 
elecsys_PR 
    
0.751*** 
     
(0.166) 
elecsys_mixed 
    
0.692*** 
     
(0.172) 
elecsys_plur 
    
0.749*** 
     
(0.169) 
Intercept 1.066*** -0.747*** -0.836*** -0.852** -1.654*** 
 
(0.0322) (0.207) (0.284) (0.352) (0.390) 
      N 1,049 1,049 883 883 883 
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.149 0.130 0.193 0.212 
Notes: Since this is a logistic specification, the magnitude of the coefficients cannot be 
interpreted, but the sign of the coefficient signifies the direction of the relationship. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 13 Relationship between GDP per capita and voter turnout with logistic 
specification in model (2) 
 
 
In Figure 13, we see that if log of GDP per capita is low, voter turnout increases 
substantially, while if log of GDP per capita is low, the jump in voter turnout is much less. 
As predicted, compulsory voting policies shifts the curve up between 6 to 13 points 
depending on the level of per capita GDP. A shift in population from low (7 million) to high 
(100 million) increases turnout between 1 to 3 points depending on the level of per capita 
GDP. While these insights are valuable, it is important to note that the logistic function is 
fairly flat, meaning it does not have a ton of curvature in its extremes. If we limit the log of 
GDP per capita to the minimum and maximum of our sample—Nigeria in 1999 at 5.65 and 
Luxembourg in 2009 at 11.21—we see that the relationship between per capita GDP and 
voter turnout is fairly linear (see Figure 14). 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
-2.1 -1.1 -0.1 0.9 1.9 2.9 3.9 4.9 5.9 6.9 7.9 8.9 9.9 10.9
V
o
te
r 
tu
rn
o
u
t 
(a
s 
a
 p
e
rc
e
n
t)
 
GDP per capita (log) 
voluntary-low pop
compulsory-low pop
voluntary-high pop
compulsory-high pop
54 
 
Figure 14 Relationship between GDP per capita and voter turnout with logistic  
specification in model (2), anchored by Nigeria (min GDP per capita) 
and Luxembourg (max GDP per capita) 
 
 
Since almost all observations in our sample lie in the linear portion of the logistic function, it 
is reasonable to use a linear specification to model voter turnout. 
7.2 Entity- and Time-Fixed Effects Panel Model 
 
To employ a panel model, I assigned countries to entity variables and election years to time 
variables. Since elections are spaced out differently depending on country, I standardized the 
election years by assigning them a fake time variable that measures the sequence of elections 
instead of the particular year of the election. For instance, the first U.S. election in my 
sample in 1964 was assigned a 1, the second U.S. election in 1968 was assigned a 2, and so 
forth. Additionally, I omitted the following the binary variables that are consistent for 
particular entities overtime due to multicollinearity: geographical areas and electoral systems. 
Although compulsory voting is a binary variable that is typically consistent for particular 
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entities overtime, a few countries in my sample switched between voluntary and compulsory 
voting systems, so it did not have to be omitted. 
 Unlike cross-sectional models, panel regressions account for omitted variable bias 
that varies between entities or overtime with the inclusion of entity- and time-fixed effects. 
Table 6 displays two cross-sectional models (1–2) and three panel models (3–5) with entity- 
and time-fixed effects. 
Table 6 Parameter estimates for entity- and time-fixed effects panel models of  
voter turnout, 1950 – 2011 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables vt vt vt vt vt 
      
comp 7.673*** 7.445*** 13.69*** 9.867*** 12.52*** 
 
(0.977) (0.932) (1.730) (1.516) (1.780) 
ln_gdp_pc 
 
3.809*** -2.071** 2.262*** 2.998** 
  
(0.373) (0.821) (0.703) (1.280) 
ln_pop 
 
-0.597*** -1.066 -0.179 6.960*** 
  
(0.231) (1.499) (0.551) (2.086) 
Intercept 71.83*** 39.55*** 90.41*** 54.46*** 37.82*** 
 
(0.525) (3.349) (5.908) (6.196) (11.48) 
      
N 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.148 0.088 0.181 0.196 
Number of Countries 143 143 143 143 143 
      
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics and p-values testing exclusion of groups: 
Time Effects   
 
 
9.73 
(0.000) 
6.38 
(0.000) 
Country Effects   
29.24 
 (0.000) 
 
11.19 
(0.000) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
In model (1), we see that compulsory voting policies increases voter turnout by 7.7 
percentage points. When we add control variables in model (2), the coefficient on 
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compulsory voting drops slightly to 7.445 but remains highly statistically significant at the 
1% level. In model (3), which includes time-fixed effects, the coefficient on compulsory 
voting almost doubles to 13.69. Similarly, in model (4) which includes country-fixed effects, 
the coefficient on compulsory voting increases to 9.867. Finally, in model (5), with the 
inclusion of both country- and time-fixed effects, the coefficient on compulsory voting is 
12.52 with a 95% confidence interval between 10.74 and 14.3. Since the country and time 
effects and both jointly statistically significant, model (5) appears to better specified than any 
of the others. Additionally, model (5) includes the largest adjusted R2 of any model at 19.6%, 
suggesting than roughly 20% of the variation in voter turnout can be explained by this 
model. While compulsory voting remains significant in every model, the magnitude of its 
effect on voter turnout almost doubles with the inclusion of both time- and entity-fixed 
effects. 
Outside of compulsory voting, another interesting trend is that the sign on log of 
population switches based on the inclusion of both time- or entity-fixed effects in model (5). 
This suggests that controlling for differences between countries and overtime, compulsory 
voting policies, and GDP per capita, increasing population by 10 million increases turnout 
by 16 points. This is not consistent with the findings in other cross-sectional studies 
(Jackman 1987, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Blais, Massicotte and Dobrzynska 2003, Blais 
2006, Schafer 2011, Fornos, Power and Garand 2004). 
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Chapter 8 
Compulsory Voting in the United States 
To predict what voter turnout would have looked like in the United States under compulsory 
voting laws, I apply my best-specified panel model to the past four U.S. elections. Table 7 
shows the predicted voter turnout in the presidential elections from 1996 to 2008. My model 
predicts that with compulsory voting policies, turnout will be over 90 percent for the 
majority of the elections, similar to that of Australia after mandatory voting laws were 
introduced. In fact, for 2004, my model predicts a turnout of over 100 percent, suggesting a 
near-perfect turnout during that election. 
Table 7 Predicted turnout in the United States with compulsory voting laws  
under panel model (5), 1996 – 200825 
Year Actual Turnout 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
Population 
(log) 
Predicted Turnout with 
Compulsory Voting 
1996 82.26 10.47 5.60 94.78 
2000 85.55 10.61 5.64 98.07 
2004 88.50 10.66 5.68 101.02 
2008 70.33 10.67 5.72 82.85 
                                                 
25 (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015a, Summers and Heston 2015). 
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Despite high predicted turnout rates, it is likely that compulsory voting laws in the 
United States face critical barriers to its introduction. While some of these barriers are 
insurmountable, these issues are not as destructive as opponents to mandatory voting argue. 
 The first of these barriers is that the size and complexity of the American electorate. 
According to Abraham (1995), “[T]he improbability of rigid enforcement of a compulsory 
voting law in a country the size and complexity of the United States” would mean that the 
“practical difficulties of enforcement of compulsory voting legislation in the United States 
would be Herculean.” Though compulsory voting has worked in Australia and Belgium, 
their population size is only a fraction of that of the United States.26 However, the United 
States stands as a nation with an advanced economy, national integration, and modern 
infrastructure—all of the necessary components to administer compulsory voting effectively. 
As compared to other laws that are scrupulously enforced by the government—for instance, 
the imposition, calculation, collection, and regulation of taxes—mandatory voting seems far 
easier. As Hill (2006) explains, “Even a developing nation like Brazil, which has a population 
of around 170 million, experiences high levels of illiteracy, and has considerable geographical 
barriers, still manages to administer compulsory voting with reasonable effectiveness.” 
It is likely that compulsory voting will face political opposition through partisan 
politics. Generally speaking, low turnout is said to benefit the conservative Republican Party, 
as non-voters, who tend to be of lower socioeconomic status, are more likely to side with the 
                                                 
26 Population figures: Australia (23 million), Belgium (11 million), and United States (319 million) according to 
the World Bank (2015). 
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Democratic Party. Republicans, for instance, opposed the Motor Voter Act, which 
automatically registers all drivers as they obtain or renew their driver’s licenses, since they 
believed it would mobilize Democratic supporters. However, it is likely that compulsory 
voting is something that will take time to be accepted. Most conservative parties were first 
opposed to universal suffrage, and yet, with the passage of time, they accepted it as the 
correct policy decision, something “right and proper” (L. Hill 2006). Lijphart (2001) argues 
that compulsory voting should follow a similar trend, eventually “accepted as an 
uncontroversial and national ‘extension of universal suffrage.’” Additionally, the 
conventional wisdom that compulsory voting always benefits Democrats could be 
misplaced. Citrin, Schickler, and Sides (2003) modeled the effect of full turnout in three 
cycles’ worth of United States Senate races. They found that under universal turnout, 
“Democrats fare better in each scenario [yet] few outcomes would have changed” (Citron, 
Schickler and Sides 2003).27 In other words, the Democratic candidate was not always the 
beneficiary of universal turnout.  
Likely the most intractable barrier to the introduction of compulsory voting is a 
deep-seated cultural aversion to states interfering with individual autonomy. Hasen (1996), 
for instance, has advocated for compulsory voting to shape preferences within a polity, yet 
he worries that it “would be construed as ‘a failure of the democratic experiment’ which 
Americans hold so dear.” Martin Wattenberg (1998) has a similar line of reasoning: 
“America’s Lockean individual rights culture would lead most to assert strenuously ‘that they 
have an inviolable right to not vote.’” These political thinkers, however, miss the point that 
compulsory voting is not taking away a citizen’s right not to vote. As only registration and 
                                                 
27 See also Marcus (2014). 
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attendance are compulsory, voters can return blank or spoiled ballots back to the polls. 
When compared to other problems of collective action solved by mandatory means (i.e., 
schooling, taxation, jury duty, military service, and garbage separation), compulsory voting 
“doesn’t seem all that intrusive” (L. Hill 2006). Lijphart (1998) also contends, “[B]efore we 
put the right not to vote on too high a pedestal, let us also remember that non-voting is a 
form of free riding – taking advantage of the benefits of democracy without contributing to 
it – and that free riding of any kind may be rational, but that it is also selfish and immoral.”  
Even so, some might argue that compulsory registration and attendance do infringe 
on liberal-democratic principles of choice. When citizens are forced to register and attend a 
polling place, they no longer have a choice to conscientiously object to voting. Yet, to argue 
for this would be to say that choice is more important that a range of democratic values that 
compulsion preserves, namely democratic legitimacy, representativeness, political equality, 
majority will, and minimization of elite power. Hill (2006) argues that “putting choice 
first…sacrifices another important liberal right: equality of political opportunity,” which is a 
“value” that is “generally undisputed by liberal democrats.” Furthermore, the issue of the 
conscientious objector, who wants to protest the system, can be solved in two ways. First, 
the objector could submit something akin to an Australian ‘please explain’ letter in order to 
justify why he or she does not want to vote. Second, ballot papers could be expanded to 
capture a wider range of political responses, for instance, an open category to provide 
respondents with a space to write their comments or a ‘protest vote’ to record disaffection 
with the system. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the impact that mandatory voting policies have on voter turnout within 
a particular country and looks into the case of the United States. Over the past few decades, 
voter turnout has fallen substantially, which has negative implications in terms of widening 
the socioeconomic voter gap and dampening democratic values of representativeness and 
majority will. To ameliorate this issue, many countries, particularly those in Latin America, 
have turned to compulsory voting as a solution. 
This study shows that compulsory voting does indeed increase voter turnout, similar 
to the conclusions met by other scholars. Through a preliminary qualitative analysis, I find 
that the adoption of compulsory voting in Australia boosted turnout by 31 points, while the 
abandonment of the policy in the Netherlands drops turnout by 16 points. To predict how 
much voter turnout would increase within the United States, I perform a quantitative 
multivariate regression analysis. I extend past empirical studies by looking at a wider 
selection of countries over a longer time-period and applying a panel regression model to 
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mitigate omitted variable bias. In the best-specified model, turnout increases by 13 points 
with mandatory voting laws.  
When applying the model to the United States, turnout increases to over 90 percent 
in the past four presidential elections, with the exception of the 2008 election. While 
mandatory voting laws appear particularly compelling within a country like the United States 
that has low voter turnout, there are critical barriers to adopting such policies. Political 
opposition, cultural aversion, and complexity with enforcement are just some of the barriers 
to America passing laws compelling citizens to vote on either the state or federal level. 
To the extent that we can apply my model to country-specific cases, it presents two 
key limitations. First, the model does not control for differences in geographic areas because 
of multicollinearity. Differences in geographic region could have a large impact on turnout. 
For instance, if a country experiences a major movement to overthrow a tyrannical 
government and move into a democratic regime, citizens in neighboring countries may feel 
compelled vote. Second, the model does not consider the differences in turnout based on 
stricter or milder enforcement mechanisms. These considerations should be the topic of 
further research. 
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Appendices 
Table 8 Description of variables in IDEA Voter Turnout Database28 
  
                                                 
28 (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2014). 
Variable Type Description 
country String Names of the countries for which voter turnout and other relevant 
statistics are provided 
eltype String The type of election, whether it be a legislative election (only lower 
house), presidential election, or European Parliament election 
year Numeric Year in which the country had an election, includes from 1945-2015 
vt Percentage Voter turnout = vote / reg 
vote Numeric Total number of people who voted in an election, as reported by the 
national electoral management body 
reg Numeric The number of people who were registered for an election, as reported 
by the national electoral management body 
vapvt Numeric Voting age population turnout = vote / vap 
vap Numeric Voting age population or the total number of potential voters of voting 
age in a given country 
pop Numeric The total population in the country at the time the election took place 
invot Numeric The percentage share of votes that were invalid against vote 
fhav Numeric Freedom House indicator which represents the level of democracy and 
political freedom in a country – measured from 1 (free) to 7 (not free) 
fhpr Numeric Freedom House indicator on the dimension of political rights – 
measured from 1 (free) to 7 (not free) 
fhcl Numeric Freedom House indicator on the dimension of civil liberties – 
measured from 1 (free) to 7 (not free) 
comp Binary If a country has compulsory voting or not, with a “yes” indicating 
compulsory voting and a “no” indicating voluntary voting 
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Table 9 Alphabetical list of 143 countries covered in study29 
Albania 
 
Cyprus 
 
Kazakhstan Philippines 
Angola 
 
Czech Republic Kenya 
 
Poland 
Antigua and Barbuda Denmark 
 
Korea, Republic of Portugal 
Argentina Djibouti 
 
Kuwait 
 
Romania 
Armenia 
 
Dominica 
 
Kyrgyzstan Rwanda 
Australia 
 
Dominican Repub. Latvia 
 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Austria* 
 
Ecuador 
 
Lebanon 
 
Senegal 
Azerbaijan Egypt 
 
Lesotho 
 
Serbia 
Bahamas 
 
El Salvador Liberia 
 
Sierra Leone 
Bahrain 
 
Equatorial Guinea Lithuania 
 
Singapore 
Bangladesh Estonia 
 
Luxembourg Slovenia 
Barbados 
 
Ethiopia 
 
Madagascar South Africa 
Belarus 
 
Fiji 
 
Malawi 
 
Spain 
Belgium 
 
Finland 
 
Malaysia 
 
Sri Lanka 
Belize 
 
France 
 
Maldives 
 
Sudan 
Benin 
 
Gabon 
 
Mali 
 
Suriname 
Bermuda 
 
Georgia 
 
Malta 
 
Sweden 
Bhutan 
 
Germany 
 
Mauritania Switzerland* 
Bolivia 
 
Ghana 
 
Mauritius 
 
Taiwan 
Bosnia & Herzegovina Greece 
 
Mexico 
 
Tajikistan 
Botswana Grenada 
 
Mongolia 
 
Thailand 
Brazil 
 
Guatemala* Montenegro Togo 
Bulgaria 
 
Guinea 
 
Morocco 
 
Tunisia 
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Turkey* 
Burundi 
 
Honduras 
 
Namibia 
 
Turkmenistan 
Cambodia Hungary 
 
Nepal 
 
Uganda 
Cameroon Iceland 
 
Netherlands* Ukraine 
Canada 
 
India 
 
New Zealand United Kingdom 
Cape Verde Indonesia Niger 
 
United States 
Central African Repub. Iraq 
 
Nigeria 
 
Uruguay* 
Chad 
 
Ireland 
 
Norway 
 
Uzbekistan 
Chile 
 
Israel 
 
Oman 
 
Venezuela* 
Colombia 
 
Italy* 
 
Pakistan 
 
Yemen 
Comoros 
 
Jamaica 
 
Panama 
 
Zambia 
Costa Rica Japan 
 
Paraguay 
 
Zimbabwe 
Croatia 
 
Jordan 
 
Peru 
  
 
                                                 
29 Bold countries indicate compulsory voting for every election in the sample. 
* indicates that the imposition of compulsory voting fluctuates over the time period.  
(International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015a) 
